

ACDA review(s) completed.

Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R01441R000100030009-2

25X1A9A

CONFIDENTIALUS/EP/50
April 19, 1960

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
to the
CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
Geneva, Switzerland March 15, 1960

Summary of Attached Memorandum

TO: Mr. Eaton

FROM: Robert E. Matteson

SUBJECT: Strategy Re Summit and 10 Nation Conference

1. The Soviet on the world chess board have a well-defined objective and strategy which they are aggressively pursuing. The West--because of alliance and internal national checks and balances--do not have as well-defined an objective and strategy--and one result has been that the Soviet have seized the initiative on matters which the West should itself be pressing.

2. The Soviet are supremely confident that time and world developments (without war) will achieve their goal of world domination. Therefore, they more than we are unwilling to risk general war. They can afford they feel to be relaxed and patient and to alter their tactics to suit their needs.

3. Their present objective in the 10 Nation talks is to show themselves to the world as the true champions of disarmament. After this, it is almost certain that, as noted in Khrushchev's September 19th speech, they will move to Khrushchev's partial measures--focusing on Central Europe, atom-free zones, and even the 1955 plan.

4. At the Summit, Khrushchev will try to create a "Paris spirit" and at the same time to impress the world with Soviet power. For the former--in addition to the test agreement--there may be a dramatic initiative regarding Eastern Europe; for the latter, a space exploit timed to coincide with the Summit.

5. The West--on its side--is primarily concerned with a defensive maneuver--to keep the Western alliance intact and hold a status quo in the face of divisive Western nationalist forces and Soviet pressures.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

6. At the 10 Nation talks the West, while pushing its particular separate measures, is marking time hoping to blunt the Soviet initiative on principles by tabling an admittedly unacceptable (to the Soviet) list of principles of its own and awaiting some development out of the Summit to break the stalemate.

7. Once the Soviet have obtained their public opinion mileage out of posing as the champion of radical disarmament and have made their "concession" to the West to move to concrete measures, the West will be faced--as the Soviet well know--with resolving the West's internal differences over concrete measures.

8. Assuming US policy is seriously to seek a disarmament agreement in the mutual interest, i.e. to put forward a negotiable proposal and assuming the US approach is by partial rather than comprehensive measures, the question then is which partial measures?

9. This should be determined by the overall strategic concept of balanced deterrence plus negotiability. On this basis the limited European zone of inspection is the best candidate--despite present French opposition.

10. To gain acceptance of this end, Western strategy in the 10 Nation talks (before the Summit) could take either of two courses: (a) it could hold tight to the present course--table its own set of principles and await the Soviet move to partial measures. This is what the Soviet expect the West to do--play a passive role and permit the Soviet to reap the propaganda advantage of both being the champion of radical disarmament and then of the big concession; or (b) it could take the initiative by making its own concession, calling the Soviet bluff on radical disarmament and exert pressure on the Soviet to move to concrete measures. To do this it would table a set of principles which goes further than the contemplated US-UK set of principles in meeting the Soviet April 8th statement of principles and which (in return) would exact a commitment from the Soviet that after agreement on principles

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

leading to general and complete disarmament to follow Khrushchev's own September 19th advice and proceed to partial measure, but without time limit on the process, without automatic transition, and under effective control.

11. The probability is that "b" above will not happen--and that instead the West will table some version of the present drafts of US and UK principles. If this is so, Western strategy at the Summit could still be to take an early initiative in securing acceptance of a directive to the 10 Nations to proceed to concrete measures--first a European zone and force level reductions, then perhaps the cut-off and outer space, along the lines of "b" above. Failing this, it could--with or without reference to agreement on a negotiable set of principles--take an early initiative to get Khrushchev's acceptance of a directive on particular concrete measures.

12. Finally, the US and the West should begin consideration now of tabling a revised Western plan sometime after resumption of the talks in June which would take into account deficiencies in the present Western plan. This might involve the inclusion of something on foreign bases, on regional force cuts, destruction of arms in depots, delivery systems, geographic inspection and control zones; something more on missiles and on overall force cuts; the omission of some unessentials and the addition of total national military disarmament under effective control in the final stage.

CONFIDENTIAL

0001

April 19, 1960

Memorandum

TO: Mr. Eaton
FROM: Robert E. Matteson
SUBJECT: Strategy Re Summit and 10 Nation Conference

In response to your request for ideas on US-Soviet objectives and strategy in the 10 Nation Conference and at the Summit, the following are submitted as personal (not departmental) ideas:

I

1. The Soviet are obviously playing the 10 Nation and Summit conferences in terms of a positive overall world objective and strategy. They have definite objectives and courses of action which they are coherently and aggressively pursuing.

2. The US--and the West--by contrast seem to have a less clearly thought-out objective and strategy. We seem to be on the defensive--hoping at best to counter the Soviet attack, to keep our losses low, and to keep the Western alliance united.

3. In this field of competition with the Soviet, as well as in others for the very existence of a free world, we go into battle at a certain disadvantage. Somehow the checks and balances of our system and our alliances work so effectively that initiatives seem more often than not to be checkmated by national or departmental interests, sometimes by a sheer avalanche of paper and red-tape, and often by fear of the Soviet (and also each other), or even by laziness.

4. The Soviet take the ball as champions of disarmament, peace, freedom, and relaxation of tension and run with it in wide open maneuvers--whereas the West

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
-2-

too often seems frozen in their tracks and mystified, grudgingly being dragged along a course that should be their own. The Soviet, for example, pursue a relaxation of tension as a means of relaxing our defense efforts. We seem to accept the idea and dig in our heels--instead of ourselves championing a relaxation as a means of opening up the Soviet Bloc.

II

5. How are the Soviet playing it? Above all the Soviet Communist leadership is convinced that time is on their side--that the dialectic of history is moving the people of the world scientifically toward acceptance of a communist world. The one thing at present that they seem to fear the most is that a minor incident, a miscalculation or the contradictions of "the imperialist-capitalist system" might set off a general war that would devastate the world including, of course, themselves. Hence, for example, their concern over pushing the German and Berlin question too far too fast.

6. Thus--believing that they will win the world if war can be avoided, they see it in their interest, first and foremost, to reduce or eliminate any possibility of war, to stress peaceful coexistence, and to relax tension. These very interests of theirs give the US advantages and opportunities.

7. The fact of greatest significance emanating thus far from contacts with the Soviet--both at the 10 Nation sessions and in individual conversations outside--(compared with the London Conference contacts in 1956 and 1957) is the new confidence they exhibit about the future--the confidence they have in the success of their blueprint of action for the future.

8. The impression they effectively convey is that the economic and political forces of history are everywhere moving in their direction--that their role is one of a mid-wife carefully guiding these forces in the emergence of a new society soon to be born.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

9. This being so they are relaxed, patient, and conciliatory--but also firm and not about to make concessions not in their interest.

III

10. The 10 Nation Conference is being carefully orchestrated by the Soviet to the tune the Soviet wish to play at the Summit. In the 10 Nation Conference and at the Summit their objective will be to show themselves to the world as the champions of general and complete disarmament and, if the West will not accept their plan, to put the West in the position of having rejected total disarmament.

11. At the same time in the 10 Nation Conference Zorin is showing an unusually conciliatory attitude and it is almost certain that at the Summit or before in addition to agreement in the nuclear test field the Soviet will agree as "a concession" to begin discussion of concrete measures in the first stage with primary emphasis on the Khrushchev partial measures.

12. Zorin has thus far followed religiously the Khrushchev speech on disarmament of September 19, 1959 to the UNGA. A key sentence we should make more of in this regard in that speech is the following: "It goes without saying that the Soviet Government wishes to approach the existing situation realistically, and if at present the Western Powers do not, for one reason or another, express their readiness to embark upon general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government is prepared, as before, to come to terms with other States on appropriate partial measures relating to disarmament and the strengthening of security."

13. The partial measures Khrushchev referred to in that speech centered around one idea--a regional settlement in Europe. This fact plus the recent emphasis given by the Communists to atom-free zones in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Balkans lends substance to the idea that this will be a major emphasis at the Summit. It represents still another Soviet approach at stigmatizing the use of nuclear weapons and securing their elimination.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

14. Khrushchev also recalled the May 10, 1955 "partial measures" and said the USSR "is convinced that these proposals constitute a sound basis for agreement on this vitally important issue." The May 10, 1955 plan singled out the following "partial measures" in this order: ceiling on levels of armed forces, conventional arms, and military expenditures; furnishing to a "Disarmament Commission" (presumably already established) official figures on force levels, conventional arms, and military expenditures; reductions in 2 steps of 3 great powers to 1 to 1.5 and of UK and France to 650,000 and corresponding reductions in conventional arms and military expenditures; convening of world conference on reductions of forces and arms and on prohibition of nuclear weapons; cessation of tests; pledge not to use nuclear weapons; pledge to liquidate foreign military bases; cessation of production of nuclear weapons; complete prohibition on use of nuclear weapons; elimination of nuclear weapons simultaneously with final reductions of forces and conventional arms; completion of liquidation of all foreign military bases; further reduction of arms and forces to levels necessary for internal security and UN obligations. ⁷ [Note: The above presumably are called "partial measures" by Khrushchev because they do not envisage "complete" disbandment of all forces and the destruction of all weapons as is envisaged in the September 19, 1959 plan.]

15. The Soviet overall objective at the Summit in line with the above will be to create a "Paris spirit" which will further relax tension at the same time that they try to impress the world with their growing power. In regard to the latter, they will probably try to time some new outer space exploit to coincide with the Summit meeting.

16. Having learned their lesson at the Summit in 1955 from the dramatic US "open skies" initiative, they will undoubtedly make some dramatic move of their own this time such as agreement on the test proposal, announcing the abolition of the Warsaw Pact, or the withdrawal of troops from East Europe. An important sentence in this regard in the May 10, 1955 partial

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

proposals (which Khrushchev reaffirmed in September 1959) was that the 4 Powers "immediately withdraw their armies of occupation from the territory of Germany inside their national frontiers, with the exception of strictly limited contingents of forces left temporarily in German territory pending the conclusion of an agreement for their complete withdrawal. These ends would also be served by the formation of strictly limited contingents of local police forces in both parts of Germany . . ."

IV

17. How is the West playing it? Above all it is concerned with keeping the Western alliance intact in the face of divisive nationalistic differences and Soviet pressures from the outside. It recognizes the long-term weakness of its position in Berlin; the growing power in the world of the USSR and Red China; the mounting political and economic unrest in the less developed areas of the world; and the difficulties in maintaining overseas bases and security pacts. It is of two minds about relaxation of tension, disarmament, collective security pacts, and relations with Communist countries--and this the Soviet is able to exploit.

18. At the 10 Nation Conference, the West is now marking time hoping that somehow the Summit will clarify the situation and produce some directive for the further work. It is clear that the West will not buy the Khrushchev plan as a basis of discussion. It is also clear that the West cannot disavow the recent UN resolution on general and complete disarmament--which the West regards as a goal.

19. In this situation and faced with the recent Soviet move to agreement on principles of general and complete disarmament, the West finds itself in an awkward position--again one of response to a Soviet initiative. Either it must refuse to consider general principles and thus lay itself open to further Soviet attacks of disavowing the UN resolution regarding general and complete disarmament (in the face of a public opinion which is said to consider disarmament the most important question) or

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-6-

it must accept consideration of general principles and risk being trapped, as some see it, on an irrevocable downward spiral into actual and substantial disarmament.

20. In this situation the West, on British initiative, seems to have chosen a compromise course of agreeing to discuss principles leading to general and complete disarmament--but fearful of openly committing itself to the principle of general and complete disarmament in the final stage, regardless of the intervening safeguards. At the same time, and hopefully without suffering a public opinion loss, it has reason to believe the Soviet will see that agreement even on principles is out of the question and will then move to the discussion of concrete measures, as indicated in the key sentence of Khrushchev's September 19th speech (para. 12 above).

21. When the Soviet has succeeded in its immediate objective of showing that the West is not really the true champion of general and complete disarmament and when the West has succeeded in its immediate objective of getting the Soviet to discuss concrete measures leading toward general and complete disarmament, then the West will be faced with the difficult problem of which concrete measures it should seek agreement on--for it is here, as the Soviet know, that internal Western differences become very much in evidence. The French will not agree to a force level, which the US wants. The US will not want to become too deeply involved in missiles, which the French want. The UK wants to relate nuclear disarmament to conventional disarmament, but the US is willing to try them separately. The French will not agree to a cut-off by itself. The US on the other hand would. The UK would agree to the destruction of arms in depots, the US wouldn't. The US will agree to zones, the French will not, etc. The only item on which all the West seems to be in agreement is outer space--and this in the face of the paramount objective of keeping the Western alliance intact.

V

22. What then should be Western position in the 10 Nation Conference and at the Summit on the subject of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
-7-

the substance of disarmament? US policy--as laid down in 1955--and it is assumed Western policy--is to negotiate the subject seriously with the idea of arriving at an agreement in the mutual interest. If this were not US policy, the strategy would be entirely different.

23. The next question is whether the West should pursue the road of specific, partial measures or a comprehensive plan. The UK and French lean toward the latter, the US and Canadians toward the former. The compromise is the present Western plan which is comprehensive in theory but partial in fact, there being no requirement to agree to consecutive measures before agreeing on and implementing any one specific measure. Within the US Government, some in the Department of State and the Killian panel seem to favor the comprehensive approach; the rest seem to favor the partial, step-by-step approach.

24. The answer to this question, however, should lie in the field of US overall strategic policy. Here the more-or-less accepted concept is one of a stabilized deterrence, i.e. creating and maintaining a power balance that prevents either side from gaining such advantage that it would be willing to risk the consequences of general nuclear war by striking first. Those who argue for a comprehensive plan see it as the best insurance of not destabilizing the deterrent. The Soviet themselves seem to favor this approach. Those who argue for specific one-at-a-time concrete measures make the same argument and argue against a comprehensive plan on the general ground one cannot foresee the future accurately enough to lock oneself into a comprehensive plan. However, this need not necessarily be so given indefinite time factors and non-automatic transition from stage to stage.

25. Actually the fact is that there need not be much difference between the two approaches and the simplest line of advance is probably--as in the test ban case--one step at a time. This seems to be the US approach and one to which the rest of the 10 nations in varying degrees are not averse.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
-8-

26. This being so--Western strategy should be to advance partial, concrete measures--of such a nature and in such a way as not to upset the balance. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Western military people are reported to be already beginning to emphasize the b and c part of the abc weapons to compensate for what they deem to be the consequences of the expected test ban. If this is the case, there will be a corresponding reaction on the Soviet side and those who argue that agreement on any single measure in effect increases tension and steps up the arms race will have scored a point.

27. The next question of substance is which specific measures fit best the US overall strategic concept and which, at the same time, are most likely to be agreed on. At present in the 10 nation field the one that stands out most clearly--despite French objection--is a limited European zone of inspection and control to which will probably have to be added at some point some reduction of foreign troops. The next is a US-Soviet reduction of forces by steps to 2.1 with a commitment to go this far and further under certain conditions and with some reduction (and destruction) of conventional arms. Finally--possibilities, albeit more difficult, are some kind of agreement in the outer space, missiles, bases field (or in outer space--as distinct from missiles--alone), and on the cut-off.

VI

28. Finally--what should be the Western strategy in the 10 Nation Conference and at the Summit? Assuming--as is the case--that US policy is to sincerely seek an agreement in the disarmament field and that we have agreed on a step-by-step partial measures approach, Western strategy in the 10 Nation Conference (before the Summit) should be to get agreement on--or at least to table--a set of principles that if necessary goes half-way toward meeting the Soviet April 8th statement of principles and which in return exacts a commitment from the Soviet to proceed to the consideration of partial measures. In doing this we should make good use of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-9-

sentence from the Khrushchev September 19 speech which says the USSR is prepared to come to terms on partial measures but at the same time saying we do not disavow the goal of radical disarmament.

29. In this regard, the West with some important modifications might even take another look at the April 8th Soviet statement. The preamble might be changed by inserting after "implementation" the words "of measures leading to" and striking the last clause concerning a treaty. The same is true of paragraph 1 by inserting "national military" at end of line 1; by inserting "national military" before "armaments" in line 2; the same before "production" line 3; the same before "nuclear" line 5; the same before "production" lines 6, 10, and 11. Paragraph 2 -- strike "according to an agreed sequence" and the last part about time-limit. Paragraph 3 -- essentially okay, but insert "leading to" before "general" in second line. Paragraph 4 -- essentially okay but add the provision on the international force. Paragraph 5 -- strike program and insert "measures leading to" before "general" in line 1 and strike "by the treaty" and add "by the agreed measures." Unnumbered paragraph 6 -- strike "treaty" and insert "measures leading to." Unnumbered paragraph 7 -- insert "measures leading to" line 2 and insert "it is hoped" at the end of line 3. Strike unnumbered paragraph 8 and insert a commitment to proceed--as indicated by Khrushchev's September speech but with changes--to consider special measures. Such special measures should be drawn from the 1960 Western plan and the USSR 1955 plan and might be any of following: then list the 6 measures in the UK and US list of principles.

30. By telling the Soviet and the world in the 10 Nation Conference that we stand by the UN resolution on complete and general disarmament, that we are ready to meet the Soviet half-way (para. 29 above) on principles, and that we recall Khrushchev's words on proceeding to partial measures in his September speech, we would--as a possible alternative--put the Soviet on the defensive and push them toward discussion of specific measures.

CONFIDENTIAL

-10-

31. Western strategy at the Summit would depend in part on what happens before the Summit in the 10 Nation Committee. The probability is that nothing much will happen except for the West tabling an (already admitted by Ormsby-Gore) unacceptable (to the Soviet) statement of principles and the possibility of the Soviet moving before the Summit to partial measures.

32. In the event nothing happens, the West at the Summit might push the line in paragraph 29 above, i.e. making "a concession" on principles in turn for Soviet acceptance of a directive to 10 nations to start the discussion of specific measures including first and foremost the limited European zone.

33. Finally, the US and the West should begin now a consideration of a revision of their present plan to make more negotiable specific measures. This might involve inclusion of items on bases, missiles, over-all and token regional force cuts, destruction of arms in depots, the exclusion of the connection between transfers and conventional disarmament, etc. It ought to involve also without qualms the acceptance of total national military disarmament in the final stage under effective control so that the Soviet can be at least "disarmed" unilaterally of that public opinion weapon.

CONFIDENTIAL